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Botnets have become a common and costly adversary for large corporations and governments. 
Hosts infected with botnet malware communicate to a central command and control server, from 
which bot developers can launch coordinated malicious attacks. Security organizations across 
the globe employ researchers to triage and takedown botnet systems through careful reverse 
engineering and analysis. These takedowns are costly due their reliance on manual analysis, and 
do not scale to the enormous number of botnet variants that are circulating and regularly 
discovered [4]. Researchers are fighting an uphill battle to contain the damage by botnets to 
computer systems around the world, and are in need of more effective, automated approaches to 
aid in rapidly executing botnet takedowns. 
 
Automated vulnerability discovery is nothing new to the world of computer security. There is a 
wealth of research on methods of identifying vulnerabilities in a range of computer software 
[5,6]. Yet, in the research community, these techniques have seldom been applied to discover 
vulnerabilities in malware. In our research, we explore how recent advancements in binary 
analysis systems can be used to surface vulnerabilities in malware. Specifically, we look at how 
automated understanding of botnet clients can be used to uncover vulnerabilities in a command 
and control server.  
 
Over the course of our research, we have looked at many different methods for uncovering 
vulnerabilities in client software. In this thesis, I focus on the development of one such method 
which looks to fingerprint versions of free and open source software (FOSS) libraries. These 
widely available libraries are commonly used by malware authors during development. I 
explore cases where these FOSS libraries used by a botnet client must necessarily constrain the 
version of the same FOSS library running on a command and control server (i.e. the outdated 
client does not support connecting to newer versions of the server software). This, in cases we 
analyze, can open the command and control server to possible attacks, and this form of analysis 
readily lends itself to automation. Our overall work in this area remains preliminary - the 
vulnerability detection technique I discuss is one of several that will be included in our final 
research. 
Background 
In order to receive instructions, botnet clients must communicate over a network to a command 
and control server. During preliminary exploration of our malware dataset, we noted that many 
samples used open source client libraries to facilitate this communication. This is not surprising, 
as free and open source software (FOSS) libraries have been shown in studies to be commonly 
used by malware authors - so much so that they are often used as a method for categorizing and 




FOSS libraries, as all complex software, are subject to periodic vulnerability disclosures. 
Several tools are available to automatically check systems for out of date libraries and 
recommend remediation steps. Cve-bin-tool, a binary analysis tool developed by Intel, is one 
such tool. When run on a binary, it fingerprints versions of common FOSS libraries used by a 
given executable, and presents known vulnerabilities affecting the detected version [9].  
 
In any client-server system, software engineers must work hard to ensure compatibility. Since 
clients and servers can be updated independently, authors typically standardize on a protocol, 
which defines the proper interaction between the two entities. As long as a protocol is always 
followed, the client and server can be updated independently and still remain compatible. 
Inevitably, however, a protocol will need to be modified which breaks compatibility with old 
versions of the client and server software. Breaking compatibility can have a range of 
consequences. Oftentimes, an incompatible client and server will refuse to establish connection. 
In other instances, the effects may be more subtle, such as a degraded set of supported features 
or reduced speed of communication. 
 
Compatibility issues lead to the creation of bands of software versions in many popular network 
libraries, where certain combinations of servers and clients are compatible (when they support 
the same protocol version) or incompatible (when a client supports different protocol versions 
from the server). Since botnet clients must be able to communicate with a command and control 
server for proper operation, the two must support the same version of the protocol they use to 
communicate. So, by detecting the version of a protocol used by a client we can constrain the 
possible range of protocol versions that the server is utilizing. It’s important to note that the 
version of a FOSS library may not necessarily match the protocol version; many updates will 
often be released for a library without the underlying protocol version changing. 
 
We divide these constraints into two types: 
● A partial constraint is a range of server versions that a client will permit connections to 
but with reduced functionality or missing features. 
● A full constraint is a range of server versions that a client will refuse to connect to. It 
would be impossible for a command and control server to be running one of these 
versions, as the botnet client would not be able to connect or properly interpret 
commands. 
 
Constraints on server versions can be both forward (for releases created after the release date of 
the client software) and backward (for releases created prior to the release date of the client 
software). An example of possible constraints is shown in the table below. Version numbers 
follow the semantic versioning scheme, where a greater major, minor, or patch number indicates 




Constraint examples for software library libfoo 
Client Version Server Version Type Comment 
2.X.X 3.X.X+ Forward Full 
Constraint 
Breaking change 
introduced in version 
3.0, 2.X.X clients 
cannot connect 
2.X.X 1.X.X Backwards Partial 
Constraint 
2.X.X client supports 
features not 
supported by 1.X.X 
servers 
1.X.X 2.X.X-3.X.X Forward Partial 
Constraint 
2.0 server introduces 
new features not 
supported by older 
clients 
1.X.X 3.X.X+ Forward Full 
Constraint 
Breaking change 
introduced in 3.0, 
1.X.X clients cannot 
connect 
 
Since FOSS library authors often operate as volunteers with limited resources, it is common for 
FOSS libraries to define a support period for a library version. After this support period, the 
unsupported version (called “end of life”) is typically no longer updated with security patches 
and thus accumulates an attack surface as new vulnerabilities in the library are discovered. For 
our research, we look to detect end of life versions of FOSS libraries in our client that have a 
forward full or partial constraint on all currently supported versions of the software. For partial 
constraints, we look at cases where the unsupported features are security-related and increase 
attack surface. For full constraints, samples matching these properties indicate that the 
corresponding server component must also be on an end of life version and thus possibly 
vulnerable to exploits of unpatched vulnerabilities. 
 
In the rest of this paper, we discuss several examples of constraints in popular FOSS libraries. 
Then, we develop a system to automatically detect samples utilizing vulnerable library versions 





For the purposes of this thesis, we chose several candidate libraries to research from a large list 
of open source software libraries [10]. For each library, we public documentation provided by 
FOSS library authors to determine which library versions introduced a breaking protocol 
change. From this documentation, we developed a set of candidate constraints. The constraints 
were then confirmed through analysis of library source code and functional testing of relevant 
library versions detailed below. We briefly discuss the libraries investigated broken down by 
constraint type. 
Partial Constraints 
Software Client Version Server Version Type 
Libssl 0.9.8 and prior All Partial Forwards and 
Backwards Constraint 




As examples of partial constraints we focused on end of life versions of two popular network 
cryptography libraries. Old cryptography client libraries are often forward compatible with 
newer web servers, but only support cipher suites for authentication and authorization that are 
deemed outdated and unsafe by the security community. 
Libssl 
Libssl, developed by the OpenSSL project, is a popular library for securing network 
communications between a client and server. Libssl 0.9.8 and prior have a maximum supported 
TLS version of TLS 1.0, which is widely considered end of life and susceptible to denial-of-
service and information disclosure attacks [7,8,11]. Consequently, any server accepting 
connections from a 0.9.8 client must, at best, communicate with the client using TLS 1.0. Thus, 
there is a high probability of success in denial of service or information disclosure attacks 
against such a server. 
Libopenvpn 
OpenVPN is a popular library for creating virtual private network (VPN) connections. 
OpenVPN 2.2.0 and prior are end-of-life, and OpenVPN versions prior to 2.3.3 have a 
maximum supported TLS version of TLS 1.0 [12,13]. As discussed above, this leads botnets 




Software Client Version Server Version Type 
Libmongoc 1.0 or prior 3.X.X+ Full Forward 
Constraint 
Libmysqlclient 4.1.0 or prior 5.6+ Full Forward 
Constraint 
 
As examples of full constraints we look at two examples of popular database libraries that have 
undergone breaking protocol changes at some point in their history. These protocol changes 
force a partition - libraries with a version at/below the version of protocol change are 
incompatible with newer server versions. 
Libmongoc 
MongoDB underwent access control changes in the database’s 3.0 release. Thus, shells and 
client libraries on versions below 3.0 are not compatible with 3.0 when access control is 
enforced, and all clients below 3.0 are now end of life [14,15]. 
Libmysqlclient 
MySQL 4.1.0 and older use an outdated authentication mechanism that is not supported in 
clients 5.6 and newer [16]. MySQL 5.6 is end of life [17]. Clients running 4.1.0 and below 
cannot connect to servers 5.6 and more recent. 
Design 
Our goal for this research is to introduce methods of automatically identifying vulnerabilities in 
botnet command and control infrastructure. The constraints mentioned above provide a 
framework for identifying server vulnerabilities with only the knowledge of a FOSS library 
version utilized by a client. In this section, we develop a system capable of rapidly analyzing 
malware samples, determining the client version of any FOSS libraries they use, and matching 
these clients to constraints. 
Static Linking 
In a statically linked binary, all relevant library routines used by the binary are included 
alongside the binary code in a single executable package. The advantage of this approach is 
portability - the author does not have to rely on any system-installed packages for the binary to 
function properly. For this reason, statically linking libraries is common by malware authors. In 
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our work here, we limit ourselves to developing a robust method of fingerprinting library 
versions in statically linked binaries. Our work to fingerprint dynamically linked libraries 
included by a malware author is ongoing. 
Detector Development 
For each FOSS library we are testing, we wrote regular expressions to match known strings 
contained in binaries using the library and associated these with the proper library version. We 
developed two detectors for each library, one to match any version of the library (a “library 
detector”), and one to specifically match versions satisfying our constraint (a “constraint 
detector”). These two detectors work in tandem - once a library is detected, the constraint 
detector is used to validate if the library version is vulnerable  
 
Library detectors for libraries tested 
Library Rule 





Constraint detectors for libraries tested 
Library Rule 
Libssl (?i)part of OpenSSL[ a-z]*0\.[0-8]\.[0-9]+[a-
z]*, (?i)part of OpenSSL[ a-z]*0\.9\.[0-8][a-
z]*, (?i)OpenSSL[ a-z]*0\.[0-8]\.[0-9]+[a-z]*, 
(?i)OpenSSL[ a-z]*0\.9\.[0-8]+[a-z]* 
Libopenvpn (?i)OpenVPN[ a-z]*[01]\.[0-9]+, 
(?i)OpenVPN[ a-z]*2\.[01] 
Libmongoc (?i)db version[ a-z]*v?[0-2]\.[0-9]+ 






Our dataset, received from industry and academic collaborators, contains 190,319 Windows 
Portable Executable format malware samples. Our experiments were run on the entire dataset. 
Experimental Setup 
Our experiments were run on a virtual machine in a lab-owned cluster with 16 virtual cores and 
48 GB of RAM. Each binary was checked by the execution engine for a match with the 
detectors mentioned, and overall results were tallied. Then, 100 samples matching each library 
detector and constraint detector were chosen at random. These matches were checked for 
accuracy by manually disassembling and inspecting the sample in question. These results were 
used to assess the accuracy of the detector. For detectors matching less than 100 samples, all 
matches were inspected. 
Discussion 
Table 1 - Library Detector Effectiveness 
Detector Detections TP FP 
Libssl 100 91 9 
Libopenvpn 42 37 5 
Libmongoc 1 1 0 
Libmysqlclient 100 98 2 
 
Table 2 - Constraint Detector Effectiveness 
Detector Detections TP FP 
Libssl 100 98 2 
Libopenvpn 0 N/A N/A 
Libmongoc 0 N/A N/A 




Our results found the Libssl library detector to detect 91 true positives out of 100 samples, the 
Libopenvpn detector to detect 37 true positives out of 42 samples, the Libmongoc detector to 
detect 1 true positive out of 1 sample and the Libmysqlclient to detect 98 true positives out of 
100 samples. The constraint detector for Libssl had 98 true positives and 2 false positives, and 
the Libmysqlclient constraint detector was completely accurate. The constraint detectors for 
Libopenvpn/Libmongoc detectors were unable to be evaluated as they both did not flag any 
samples. 
 
While the library detectors were moderately accurate, there were several matches that the 
detectors miss-classified. In the cases we analyzed, this was due to stray strings included in the 
binary that happened to be the same as strings that were tested by our detectors. This is certainly 
a weakness of this detector approach - a more robust detection system would confirm usage of 
the library by analyzing a control flow graph of the target sample to ensure library functions are 
being called. We are developing a system to incorporate this analysis now, and we hope to use 
such techniques for detectors in our final research. 
 
Constraint detectors were found to have a higher degree of accuracy than library detectors. This 
is likely due to the tighter restrictions on the regex to only match certain specific version ranges 
and strings in the samples analyzed. That said, these detectors are still susceptible to the same 
issue as the library detectors. In our framework, a valid library detection is required before a 
constraint detector is run (the library detector must flag positive). Thus, as the above-mentioned 
improvements are implemented, the constraint detector should improve, as it will receive higher 
quality input from the improved library detectors.   
 
Our overall goal for this work is to automatically surface previously unseen vulnerabilities that 
could be used to disrupt botnet activity. Each true positive constraint detected represents an 
automatically discovered botnet vulnerability. However, some samples vulnerable to our 
techniques may go undetected (i.e. false negative results). Due to the low rate of detection over 
a large dataset, it was infeasible to determine a precise false negative rate, but we were able to 
identify probable classes of false negatives based on specific samples observed in our dataset:  
● Other libraries implementing the same protocol, e.g. other client libraries for MySQL 
other than the most popular Libmysqlclient. Our approach tags samples based on 
specific signatures in the library under test and did not catch these samples even though 
they satisfy the same constraints. In future work, we plan to solve this by expanding the 
set of detectors to encompass multiple popular libraries for each protocol. 
● Variants of libraries under test. OpenSSL, in particular, is included in binaries in a wide 
variety of formats. While it is frequently used by the top-level binary code, it may also 
be included as a sub-dependency of another library. For the vast majority of cases, we 
observed that our detectors matched these variants properly. However, there were cases 
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observed where a binary used Libssl core functions but no longer included the strings 
matched by our detector. In future work, we plan to solve this by incorporating more 
sophisticated techniques for detector fingerprinting, including hashing of library 
assembly instructions. 
 
Table 3 - Detected Constraints 



















4838 466 9.6% 0.20% 





42 0 0% 0% 











600 67 11.67% 0.04% 
 
Detections for each library constraint, after being run on our dataset, are shown above. The table 
also shows the number of detections as a percentage of the total dataset (190,319 samples), 
samples that contained the FOSS library at any version, and the constraint detections as a 
percentage of library detections. We detected 466 samples including Libssl and 67 samples 
including Libmysqlclient that are vulnerable to our constraints. Each detection represents a 
unique, previously unknown vulnerability in a botnet that could be used in more quickly 
understanding and taking down botnet infrastructure. While we detected 0 instances of 
Libopenvpn and Libmongoc constraints, we believe this likely due to the small percentage of 
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Libopenvpn and Libmongoc samples in our total dataset. Work is ongoing to grow the size of 
our dataset under review and add additional libraries to this framework. 
Future Work 
We believe we are early in our research into this subject, and there are several areas of future 
work. 
Benign Software 
While the techniques discussed are applied to malware, the same techniques could also be used 
to alert software developers of possible vulnerabilities in their software. We believe that the sort 
of software scanning detailed in this paper could be a very powerful tool to proactively identify 
and prevent security incidents before they occur.   
Malware Families 
Studies of modern botnets have shown that they are often decentralized - it is possible for many 
variants and versions of malicious bots to interoperate with each other [2,3]. Some of these bots 
may use libraries or library versions that are more vulnerable than others (for example, an older 
release). Thus, if it is possible to effectively establish the lineage of a malware sample, it may 
also be possible to create a superset of possible FOSS vulnerabilities in the server based on the 
most severe vulnerabilities present in all variants of the botnet client. 
Library Constraints 
For the experiments conducted, we consider the version constraints discussed in the strictest 
possible sense - and limit our exploration to cases where we can be completely assured that a 
vulnerability exists. However, the library versions also tell us something interesting about the 
binary - a ballpark estimation of when it was created or last patched. The time at which the 
client was created may aid in studies of botnet lineage, and also allow researchers to target 
possible attacks against a server with a higher probability of success, even if such attacks are not 
assured to succeed.  
Other Vulnerability Classes 
This exploration of FOSS library vulnerabilities is just one of several types of rules that will be 
released in our final work. All vulnerability systems fall under the same overall umbrella - using 
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